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Abstract
We construct an endogenous growth intertemporal general equilibrium model with two
types of jobs and two types of workers. We allow for job competition between high- and
low-skilled workers on the low-skilled segment of the labor market and for on-the-job search
for high skilled workers. Matching processes are represented by matching functions ` a la
Pissarides. Workers search intensities are endogenous. We distinguish between embodied and
disembodied technological progress and endogenize them through a learning by doing process
based on capital accumulation. Social returns to capital are imposed to be constant. Biased
technological change is introduced via embodied technical progress and new technologies-
skill complementarity relationship. The model reproduces quite well the unemployment rate
evolutions, the relative wage stability and the productivity slowdown puzzle observed over
the last decades. It suggests strong interactions between embodied technological progress,
growth, biased technological change, discouragement eﬀects and job competition.
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11 Introduction
Over the last 25 years the economic evolution of most European economies has been characterized
by three facts. First, there has been an upturn in unemployment rates, particularly in that of
low-skilled workers. This unemployment rise has been accompanied by a rigidity in relative
wages. Finally, after the ﬁrst oil shock, there has been a deceleration in the growth rate of
per capita output and in the growth rate of total factor productivity (productivity slowdown
puzzle1). While the two ﬁrst phenomena are European speciﬁc, the last one is observed in most
OECD countries. Table 1 shows that in spite of the increase in unemployment rates between
1970 and 2000 in most OECD countries, relative wages have remained quite rigid. Table 2
summarizes data concerning per capita output growth rates using Maddison (1991) data for the
period going from 1950-1987 and OECD data for the nineties. Even if both data sources are
not strictly comparable (particularly, data on the nineties refers to reuniﬁed Germany) it can
be suggested that while the productivity slowdown was clearly observed along the seventies and
eighties for all countries, during the nineties it seems to have reduced its pace for countries as
United States or United Kingdom.
Even if unemployment and growth problems often arise together, the literature has traditionally
treated them separately. That is, models of economic growth typically assume full employment
and models dealing with employment assume no growth. In this paper we consider both problems
together. More particularly we analyze the interactions between unemployment, relative wages
and growth observed in European countries over the last 25 years. We build a model based on
Moreno-Galbis and Sneessens (2004) on what concerns the labor market side and on Boucekkine,
del Rio, and Licandro (2002) regarding the way growth, embodied and disembodied technological
progress are introduced. The main contribution of the model here presented is to consider growth
issues while keeping, at the same time, a realistic representation of the labor market. We have
thus an endogenous growth model in an intertemporal general equilibrium setup where the labor
market is characterized by the presence of search and matching frictions.
We diﬀerentiate in the labor market between two types of jobs (complex and simple) and two
1The deceleration in growth rates is referred as puzzling simply because there is no an unanimously accepted
explanation of it.
2UNEMPLOYMENT RATES RELATIVE WAGES
1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-2001 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1995
France 3.9 9.1 10.7 D5/D9 51.7 50.8 50.3
D1/D5 60.6 61.5 60.9
Germany 1.4 5.2 7.3 D5/D9 60.8 61.0 61.4
D1/D5 60.0 64.4 67.4
Japan 1.7 2.5 3.4 D5/D9 55.9 54.4 53.9
D1/D5 58.2 58.5 60.4
United Kingdom 4.3 10.0 6.8 D5/D9 58.2 55.5 53.9
D1/D5 59.0 56.8 55.9
United States 6.2 7.2 5.5 D5/D9 .. .. 48.4
D1/D5 .. .. 48.1
D5/D9: ratio of the upper earnings limit of the ﬁfth decile of workers to the upper limit of the ninth decile. D1/D5: ratio
of the upper earnings limit of the ﬁrst decile of workers to the upper limit of the ﬁfth decile.
Source concerning unemployment rates: For France, Japan, United Kingdom and United States we use LABORSTA
database, from the International Labor Oﬃce. The data concerning Germany comes from the OECD Economic Outlook.
Source concerning relative wages: OECD Employment Outlook 1996 chapter 3. For Germany we have information only
between 1983-1993. For US data concerns only the 1993-1995 period.
Table 1: Average unemployment rates and relative wages in ﬁve OECD countries (in percent).
1950-1973 1973-1987 1990-2000
France 4.0 1.8 1.4
Germany 4.9 2.1 1.3
Japan 8.0 3.1 1.1
United Kingdom 2.5 1.8 1.9
United States 2.2 1.6 2.2
Source: The two ﬁrst columns are constructed from Tables 3.3, 3.5, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.19 in Maddison (1991). The last column
corresponds to OECD Economic Outlook No.70.
Table 2: Average growth rates of per capita output, 1950-1987, 1990-2000 (percent).
3types of workers (high- and low-skilled). We allow for job competition between high- and low-
skilled workers on the low-skilled segment of the labor market and for on-the-job search for
high-skilled workers. Search intensities are endogenous for all workers and wages are negotiated
through a normal Nash bargaining.
The distinction between embodied and disembodied technological progress has been shown to
be relevant by a number of recent theoretical and empirical works which have invoked the
embodied nature of an increasing fraction of technological progress. Particularly, according to
Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krussel (2002) 60% of US productivity growth comes from embodied
technological change. The characteristics of embodied technological progress are estimated to
play a key role in explaining some US stylized facts such as the productivity slowdown, the
decline in the relative price of investment or the persistent upturn in the equipment to output
ratio. Since these stylized facts have also been observed for many European countries, there
is a strong belief among economists that embodied technological progress is also behind. We
therefore distinguish between both types of technological progress and endogenize them through
a learning by doing (LBD) process based on capital accumulation2 that turns out to be the
engine of growth.
Social returns to capital are imposed to be constant so that a balanced growth path arises. The
productivity slowdown is explained on the basis of a reassignment eﬀect, according to which,
after the ﬁrst oil shock, the upturn in embodied technological progress crowded out the dis-
embodied technical one. This induced, on the one hand, a permanent fall in the relative price
of investment3, thereby increasing the user cost of capital4, which tended to slow down output
growth. On the other hand, the acceleration of embodied technological progress has been asso-
ciated to an increased relative demand for high-skilled labor, as a result of either technological
requirements (see Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) for the U.S. and Machin, Ryan, and
2The LBD in the ﬁnal good sector is consistent with Romer (1986) whereas LBD in the production of new
investment goods is close to Arrow (1962).
3Because the eﬃciency of the embodied technical progress production process improves at a faster rate than
that of consumption goods, the relative price of investment goods falls.
4The faster the rate at which the eﬃciency of the embodied technical progress is improved, the faster the pace
at which capital goods become obsolete. This expected loss in the value of capital is included in the usage cost of
capital.
4Van Reenen (1998) for some European countries) or induced organizational changes (see Caroli
and Van Reenen (2001) and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002)). Technological progress
over the last decades has thus been skill-biased. This new technologies-skill complementarity
relationship5 is also represented by the model.
The model is calibrated on the basis of Belgian data and simulated to test its ability to reproduce
the evolution of unemployment rates, relative wages and growth rates. Afterwards, we implement
some dynamic simulations to analyze the consequences of diﬀerent policy measures. We conclude
that the model provides a good representation of the economy and constitutes the ﬁrst attempt
to reproduce simultaneously these three stylized facts that have characterized most European
countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section makes a review on the previous literature. In
section 3 we present the model. We describe the two forms of endogenous technological progress
and determine the presence of a balanced growth path. Finally we describe labor market ﬂows,
behaviors of all agents in the model and the wage bargaining process. In section 4 we calibrate
the model on Belgian data for 1996. The properties of the model are examined by simulating its
responses to various types of shocks. We next set the technological and labor force composition
variables to their 1976 values and check the ability of our theoretical setup to reproduce the
stylized facts observed in a typical European economy (Belgium). Alternative policy scenarios
are also analyzed. Section 5 concludes.
2 Previous literature
The literature has traditionally treated separately unemployment and growth problems. In this
sense, concerning the productivity slowdown puzzle, authors like Baily (1981) argue that after
the ﬁrst oil shock, part of the stock of capital, being very energy consuming, was desaccumu-
lated. Denison (1985) points to the negative eﬀects of regulation over economic growth. Blan-
5There exists a considerable amount of empirical literature analyzing the importance of the capital-skill and/or
new technologies-skill complementarity relationship over the last decades. See Berman, Bound, and Griliches
(1994), Fitz Roy and Funke (1995), Machin, Ryan, and Van Reenen (1998), Krusell et al. (2000) or Moreno-
Galbis (2002), among others.
5chard (1997) defends that with the tertiarisation of the economy the absorption of technological
progress has become more diﬃcult and so has growth. More recent and popular arguments
(Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997)) claim that the post-1974 period was characterized by the
huge raise of information and communication technologies (embodied technological progress).
The expansion of these technologies to the whole economy takes time because of the presence
of learning costs (physical and human capital investment), which results in a reduction of the
growth rates. Finally, Boucekkine, del Rio, and Licandro (2002) suggest the existence of a
technological reassignment after the ﬁrst oil shock favoring of embodied technological progress
and against disembodied technical change. This would have induced a permanent increase in
the user cost of capital slowing down productivity growth. None of these models analyzes the
impact of growth on unemployment, or the role that unemployment could have had on growth.
On the other hand, there are also many models trying to explain the upturn in European unem-
ployment rates, that do not consider growth issues. Gautier (2002) develops a stylized partial
equilibrium model with two types of jobs, two types of workers and wage bargaining. He focuses
on the stationary state properties of the model. Dolado, Felgueroso, and Jimeno (2000) use
a similar approach (with a simpler albeit more realistic representation of wage determination)
to evaluate the job competition eﬀect triggered by the dramatic increase in the proportion of
skilled workers that took place in the late eighties in Spain. Similar models are also considered
in Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno (2002). Collard, Fonseca, and
Mu˜ noz (2002) provide a ﬁrst attempt to include this type of quantitative analysis in a dynamic
general equilibrium setup. Pierrard and Sneessens (2002) use a similar setup with on-the-job
search and endogenous search intensities for high-skilled workers so as to obtain a less mechan-
ical job competition eﬀect. Their model explains a signiﬁcant part of the unemployment rise
observed over the last twenty years. Moreno-Galbis and Sneessens (2004) use an intertempo-
ral general equilibrium setup with two types of jobs, two types of workers, job competition,
on-the-job search, endogenous search intensities for all workers and an endogenous capital-skill
complementarity relationship. Their model manages to mimic the increase in unemployment
rates as well as the relative wage rigidity by simply introducing the observed raise in the pro-
portion of high-skilled workers in the labor force and the decline in the relative prices of new
investment goods that has characterized the last decades.
6Since the beginning of the nineties there is an emerging literature introducing growth into
matching and search models of unemployment or matching and search frictions into growth
models. One of the ﬁrst attempts was made by Pissarides (2000), who analyzed the relationship
between growth and unemployment in the presence of embodied and disembodied exogenous
technical change. Bean and Pissarides (1993) develop a simple OLG endogenous growth model
with matching frictions to show how high unemployment rates can have adverse eﬀects on
growth through the reduction in the pool of savings available for investment. Aghion and
Howitt (1994) argue that growth occurs through creative destruction of low productivity jobs
by high productivity jobs (reallocation eﬀect). Merz (1995) manages to capture many of the
stylized facts observed in the U.S. labor market using a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model with
search frictions and exogenous labor augmenting technological progress. Postel-Vinay (2002)
develops a Schumpeterian model to analyze the short- and long-run responses of unemployment
to exogenous changes in the rate of technological progress. Postel-Vinay (1998) goes a step
further and instead of making only a traditional comparative static analysis, he studies the
transitional dynamics of the well known Pissarides (2000) search model in an endogenous growth
framework ` a la Romer (1986). More precisely he implements some simulations using a linearized
version of the model that turns out to be a good proxy of the “true” dynamics of the model
(this talks well about RBC models since they also use linearized models to simulate the true
dynamics of a nonlinear model). The growth-unemployment relationship is considered in an
eﬃciency-wage model framework by Brecher, Chen, and Choudhri (2002) and in a generalized
augmented Solow type model by Br¨ auninger and Pannenberg (2002).
3 The Model
The structure of the model is based on Moreno-Galbis and Sneessens (2004). There are two
broad categories of agents, households and ﬁrms. We distinguish two types of households; each
type is deﬁned by the skill level (high or low) of their members. All members of a household
supply inelastically one unit of labour; they may be employed or unemployed6.
6The representative household formulation amounts to assuming that workers of a given group are perfectly
insured against their own individual unemployment risk. This simpliﬁcation is common in the literature and
7We distinguish three types of ﬁrms:
² Intermediate ﬁrms producing high-tech intermediate goods. The production of these goods
involves complex tasks that can only be carried out by high-skilled workers.
² Intermediate ﬁrms producing low-tech intermediate goods. The production of low-tech
intermediate goods is made of simpler tasks that can be carried out by both high- or
low-skilled workers.
² A representative ﬁnal ﬁrm, which combines capital and the two intermediate goods to
produce an homogeneous ﬁnal good that can be used for consumption or capital accumu-
lation.
There is thus a double heterogeneity as in Gautier (2002), heterogeneity of jobs (complex vs
simple) and heterogeneity of workers (high- and low-skilled).
There are three types of markets: labor, goods and capital. On the labor side, we distinguish
between the complex and the simple job markets. For each type of job, we assume an exogenous
job destruction rate and represent the matching process by a standard matching function. High-
skilled unemployed workers may look for both types of jobs. Furthermore, the set of parameter
values adopted in the model guarantees the absence of corner solution, i.e. : there is always
a number of high-skilled workers in simple jobs. High-skilled workers hired on a simple job
may continue searching for a complex job (on-the-job search). Because they know that their
application will always be turned down, low-skilled job seekers never apply for complex jobs.
They may search more or less intensively for a simple job, depending on its attractiveness
compared to home production. All goods markets (the two intermediate goods and the ﬁnal
good markets) are assumed to be perfectly competitive. The price of the ﬁnal good is normalized
to one. On the capital market, the supply is determined by the stock of capital previously
accumulated by the household. The interest rate adjusts to make the quantity demanded by the
representative ﬁnal ﬁrm equal to this predetermined capital stock.
Social returns to capital are imposed to be constant, which is necessary for a balanced growth
path to arise. In order to compute the steady state we determine ﬁrst the growth rate of
reﬂects the current state of the art. Taking into account the consequences of imperfect insurance markets and
workers’s ex post heterogeneity would make the model totally untractable.
8each variable (see appendix). We then destrend the model redeﬁning it in terms of stationary
variables (intensive variables). Finally, we calibrate and simulate.
We next successively discuss about technological progress and the balanced growth path. We
then deﬁne the optimizing behavior of each agent as well as the wage bargaining problem.
3.1 Technological Progress and Balanced Growth Path
Embodied vs Disembodied Technological Progress
The production process of the ﬁnal ﬁrm is represented through a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-





















t = 1 ; (1)
where Qc
t and Qs
t represent, respectively, the intermediate complex and simple goods, f Kt the
stock of capital and e zt disembodied neutral technological progress. Because good markets are
assumed to be perfectly competitive and marginal productivity of high-skilled workers is nor-
malized to 1 (one worker produces one unit) and to º for low-skilled workers (see section 3.3,










t represent, respectively, the employment in complex jobs, the number
of simple jobs occupied by high-skilled workers and the number of simple jobs occupied by
low-skilled workers.
Embodied technological progress is introduced by allowing new investment goods to be more
productive than older ones. Following Boucekkine, del Rio, and Licandro (2002), we write the
law of motion of capital as follows7:
g Kt+1 ¡ f Kt = e et e It ¡ ± f Kt ; 0 < ± < 1 ; (3)
7Boucekkine, del Rio, and Licandro (2002) show that this simple representation can be obtained from an
explicit vintage model.
9where e It represents investment expenditures and ± is the exogenous depreciation rate of capital.
The variable e et (embodied technological progress) is an index measuring the marginal contribu-
tion of new investment goods to the aggregate capital stock (so that 1=e et can be interpreted as
the relative price of new capital goods).
Both types of technological progress are determined by a learning by doing (LBD) process based
on capital accumulation. More formally:
e et = e0 e kt
¸
and e zt = z0 e kt
°
(4)
where e0; z0; ¸ and ° are four strictly positive real numbers and e kt is the capital stock per
employed worker. The intuition behind these LBD processes is the following: the more capital
is abundant in the economy, the easier it is to innovate, and the more the economy innovates,
the more capital will accumulate.
The economic literature distinguishes at least between three types of endogenous growth models
using technological innovation as the engine of growth. On the one hand, we have the models
in which technological progress shows up as an expansion of the number of varieties of producer
and consumer products (see Romer (1987) and Romer (1990)). On the other hand, we have
the “creative destruction” models, in which growth arises from improvements in the quality of
products (see Aghion and Howitt (1992)). Finally, the LBD models introduced in Romer (1986)
assume that a ﬁrm that increases its physical capital learns simultaneously how to produce more
eﬃciently (positive eﬀect of experience on productivity). The three types of theoretical setups
have as a common point the absence of decreasing returns to scale. They uniquely diﬀer in
the way they model technological innovation. In this paper we choose the LBD as an engine of
growth because of its simplicity. Moreover, we have an accelerated obsolescence process similar
to Aghion and Howitt (1992) and social returns to capital are constant.
Finally, notice that the eﬀects of capital accumulation on technical progress are not internalized
by the ﬁrms (technological progress is the unintended by-product of capital accumulation). This
condition is consistent with the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
10Skill-Bias
The empirical evidence suggests that the use of new technologies is associated to an increased
relative demand for skilled labor, either because of technological requirements either because
induced organizational changes. The variation in the demand for skilled labor should best be
seen as resulting from a combination of embodied technological progress and new technologies-
skill complementarity. The empirical relevance of these two aspects has been emphasized for
instance by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krussel (2002) (for embodied technological progress)
and by Machin, Ryan, and Van Reenen (1998), Krusell et al. (2000) or Caroli and Van Reenen
(2001) (for capital-skill complementarity).
To reproduce this empirical observation, we assume the relative productivity of complex in-
termediate goods to be an increasing function of two indicators measuring the importance of
embodied technological progress. The ﬁrst indicator is the share of new investment goods af-
fected by embodied technological progress over total capital stock and the second, the eﬃciency






³ e et e It
f Kt
´a1
¸ ; a0; a1 ¸ 0 : (5)
The mechanism captured in equation (5) is the following: increases in the importance of embod-
ied technical progress either through the upturn in the fraction of capital goods incorporating
technological progress or through the improvement in the eﬃciency of the technological progress
learning process, increase the relative marginal productivity (in value added terms) of complex
intermediate goods and, thus, by equations (2), the relative productivity of complex jobs, which












¸ ; a0; a1 ¸ 0 : (6)
This speciﬁcation, while being somewhat ad hoc, permits, on the one hand, to make a link
between the growth side and the labor market side of the model. On the other hand, it provides
a simple mean to represent the empirically tested new technologies-skill complementary rela-
tionship8. Technology induced changes in the values of µc
t and µs
t modify the relative marginal




t an increasing function of capital
11productivity (in value added terms) of complex and simple jobs and thus the relative produc-
tivity of high-skilled workers.
The Balanced Growth Path
Provided social returns to capital are constant, i.e: ¹ = ¸ + ° or 1 = 1¡¹+¸+°, a balanced
growth path can be shown to exist (see chapters 4 and 5 of Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995)
for a reminder on the endogenous growth models characterized by the absence of diminishing
returns to capital (AK models, more precisely)). Constant social returns to capital imply the
constancy of the total eﬃciency of the LBD process. Therefore, any variation in ¹; ¸ or ° leads
to a technological reassignment (the relative importance of each type of technological progress
is modiﬁed).
Boucekkine, del Rio, and Licandro (2002) remark that if the initial capital stock (K0), the
consumption-output level (f Ct=e Yt) and the constant growth rate (g) are positive, and if the
utility is bounded, then, there exists a unique solution path in which consumption and capital
grow at rates g and ge k, respectively. Because of the complexity of our model, rather than
establishing the analytical conditions ensuring the positivity of K0, f Ct=e Yt and g, we will simply
calibrate the parameters so that these conditions are satisﬁed. Furthermore, since we work with
a logarithmic utility function, the positivity of consumption also guarantees the bounded utility.
Therefore all required conditions for an AK model are satisﬁed and a unique solution path arises.
We compute it in the appendix.
The main characteristics of the balanced growth path, can be easily deduced in an intuitive way
without requiring exhaustive computations. In the equilibrium path, output ( e Yt), consumption
(f Ct) and investment (e It) must grow at a same rate. From the account identity,
e Yt ¡ e vt = f Ct + e It (7)
we deduce that, if e Yt, f Ct and e It grow at a constant rate g, the vacancy costs (e vt) must also grow
at rate g for a balanced growth path to arise.
accumulation, would be more appropriate. However, in an endogenous growth context this hypothesis leads to
an explosive solution, since in the equilibrium balanced growth path, capital keeps continuously increasing and
therefore, the relative share of complex jobs in the production function will tend towards inﬁnity.
12Vacancy costs are traditionally indexed either to the marginal productivity of labor or to the
wages (see Pissarides (2000)). In this work we index them to wages. Because output is deter-
mined by a Cobb-Douglas production function, the marginal productivity of labor also grows at
g, which leads wages to raise at rate g too. Moreover, because unemployment beneﬁts are deﬁned
as a fraction bu (replacement ratio) of the average wage, unemployment beneﬁts increase also
at the constant rate g. The indexation of the vacancy costs together with the fact that wages
and unemployment beneﬁts grow at rate g at the equilibrium path imply that the employment
and unemployment levels, remain constant at the equilibrium. Using equation (1) we compute
the equilibrium growth rates of all variables involved in the production of the ﬁnal good:
² ge Y = g g FNc
t
= g g FNsh = g g FNsl = g, and
² g e K =
g
1¡¸, ge e = ¸
g
1¡¸ and ge z = °
g
1¡¸ .
Finally, remark that the marginal utility of the household is deﬁned as 1=e ct (the utility function is
logarithmic). This means that marginal utility decreases at the same rate as the wages increase.
As a result, it can be expected that the additional instantaneous utility obtained by a household
from having one additional member employed, remains constant at the equilibrium path.
We describe now the intensive variables9 that will be used all through the analysis. We signal
with “f” trended variables while we keep the normal notation when referring to intensive



































for the aggregate costs :
9The concept of intensive variable is quite standard in the economic growth literature and it refers to the ratio
between two variables raising at the same rate in the equilibrium path, i.e. the ratio of two trended variables.
The intensive variables are, thus, stationary at the equilibrium.
13The wages paid in complex jobs, in simple jobs occupied by high-skilled workers, in simple jobs

























































Notice that the unemployment beneﬁt is assumed to be at the same level for all workers.
The marginal increase in the surplus obtained by a ﬁrm when ﬁlling a complex vacancy, a simple























Finally, the price at which intermediate complex and simple goods are sold and the usage cost

















3.2 Labor Market Flows
Let Nc
t and Ns
t represent total employment in complex and simple jobs respectively. Simple jobs
can be occupied by high- (Nsh
t ) or low-skilled (Nsl
t ) workers, so that Ns
t = Nsh
t +Nsl
t , where, as
already stated, the set of adopted parameter values guarantees Nsh
t > 0. Let Uh
t and Ul
t denote
the number of high- and low-skilled unemployed job seekers respectively. Normalizing the total
labor force to one and denoting ® the exogenous10 proportion of high-skilled workers in the total




t = ®; and Nsl
t + Ul
t = 1 ¡ ®; (8)
10An endogenous ® would require the model to consider human capital formation and education issues, which
is above the scope of the present study.
14The number of complex and simple job matches (denoted by Mc
t and Ms
t respectively) is a
function of the number of corresponding job vacancies (V c
t and V s
t ) and eﬀective job seekers
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Both functions are assumed to be linear homogeneous.
We assume that every day (or every period), both, the high- and the low-skilled unemployed
workers, spend a certain number of hours having what we call an active life. In words, a constant
fraction of their day is spent on searching for a job or doing other productive activities (in our
case, domestic production), while the rest of the time is devoted to non-productive activities
(such as sleeping, eating, etc.). We assume that the amount of hours spent in active life is the
same for high- and low-skilled workers, and we normalize it to one.
Given the conditions prevailing on the labor market (wages, probabilities to ﬁnd jobs, etc.),
a high-skilled unemployed allocates its active time between searching for a complex job (0 ·
eht · 1) and searching for a simple job (0 · 1 ¡ eht · 1). Since the worker knows that he has
a positive probability of being hired in any of the two types of jobs, he spends all his active
time searching in both labor market segments. Moreover, a high-skilled working on a simple
job spends a fraction (0 · eot · 1) of its leisure (normalized to 1) searching for a complex job.
Besides, a low-skilled unemployed splits its active time between searching for a job in the simple
segment (0 · elt · 1) and staying at home doing domestic activities (0 · 1 ¡ elt · 1). Because
they know that their application will always be turned down, low-skilled job seekers never apply
for complex jobs, so when they are not looking for a job in the simple segment, they simply stay
at home doing domestic activities. We have therefore an asymmetry in the behavior of high-
and low-skilled workers that results from the asymmetry between complex jobs, which can only
be occupied by high-skilled workers, and simple jobs, which can be occupied by both types of
workers. Search eﬃciencies, sot, sct, sht and slt are concave and increasing functions of the
search eﬀorts, eot, eht, 1 ¡ eht and elt, respectively.















t + slt Ul
t
: (10)
15With linear homogeneous matching functions, the probabilities of ﬁnding a complex or a simple












































The probability that a simple job is ﬁlled is the sum of the probabilities of hiring a high-skilled


















We assume two exogenous job destruction rates Âc (for the complex jobs) and Âs (for the simple
jobs), implying for each type of job and worker the following employment dynamics (in terms
of vacancies and job-seekers’ search eﬀort respectively):
Nc

































Figure 1 summarizes these labor market ﬂows and transition probabilities.
Finally, notice that employment ﬂow variables (number of vacancies, (un)employment level,
probabilities of ﬁnding a job or of ﬁlling a vacancy, search intensities, number of matches)








« on-the-job-search » Nsh
Figure 1: Labor market ﬂows and transition probabilities
3.3 Behaviors
Intermediate Firms
Intermediate ﬁrms use only one type of input, high-skilled labor for complex jobs, and high- or
low-skilled labor for simple jobs. We further assume that one ﬁrm employs only one worker and
produces one unit (º units in case the vacancy is ﬁlled by a low-skilled worker) of intermediate
good. We thus keep the traditional structure one-job-one-ﬁrm which permits to represent the
process of wage negotiation through a Nash bargaining sharing rule.
An intermediate ﬁrm can open either a complex or a simple vacancy. The unitary cost of opening
a vacancy is denoted e bc
t and e bs
t for a complex and simple vacancy respectively. These costs are











0 represent strictly positive real constants, f wc
t the wage paid in a complex job
and f ws
t the average wage paid in a simple job (since this type of jobs can be occupied either
by a high- or a low-skilled worker, and each one earns a diﬀerent wage, we decided to index
simple vacancy costs to the average wage). The aggregate costs of opening complex and simple












t and V s
t stand for the number of complex and simple job vacancies.





17The asset value of a ﬁlled complex (resp. simple) vacancy is denoted as g WF
Nc




the simple vacancy is ﬁlled by a high-skilled worker or g WF
Nsl
t
when it is ﬁlled by a low-skilled).
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t and e cs
t stand, respectively, for the price of complex and simple intermediate goods; g wsh
t
and f wsl
t represent the wages paid in a simple job to a high- and a low-skilled worker, respectively.
At the equilibrium, the discount factor 1
(1+rt+1) is shown to be equal to
¯
(1+g) (see the high-skilled










t = 0. We can now rewrite the intermediate ﬁrm equilibrium



























































The representative ﬁnal ﬁrm uses capital (f Kt), complex and simple intermediate goods (Qc
t
and Qs

















t f Kt ¡ e cc
t Qc




t stands for the capital usage cost. The ﬁrst optimality conditions are given by the
standard marginal productivity conditions:
g Ff Kt = f cK
t ; g FQc
t = e cc
t ; g FQs
t = e cs
t ; (30)
where g FXt represents for the ﬁrst derivative of e F with respect to Xt.
Households
The household decisions bear on consumption and savings and on job search intensities. To avoid
untractable ex post heterogeneity issues, we assume that workers are perfectly insured against
individual unemployment risks by considering two large representative households diﬀerentiated
by their skill level: a high- and a low-skilled household. Because employment probabilities and
expected wage incomes diﬀer among them, their search behaviors, as well as their negotiated
wages will be aﬀected. We assume to simplify that the whole capital stock is owned by the high-
skilled (high-income) household. This implies assuming that the low-skilled household consumes
its current income in every period.
The representative high-skilled household
The members of the high-skilled household can be either unemployed, employed on a complex job
paying a wage f wc
t, or employed on a simple job paying a wage g wsh
t . The household decides on the
consumption level of each of its members, on the fraction of time, eht that the unemployed spend
searching on the complex segment and on the fraction of the leisure time, eot, that employed
on low-paid jobs devote to on-the-job-search. The optimization problem of the representative




















subject to constraints (8), (14-b), (15-b) and to the ﬂow budget constraint :
f wc
tNc
t + g wsh
t Nsh
t + f wu
t Uh
t + e ck




g Kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)f Kt
´
+ f Ch
t + e Tt: (32)
WH
t is a function of the initial values of the three state variables f Kt;Nc
t ;Nsh
t ; U(:) is an increasing
and concave function of per capita consumption (f Ch
t thus measures the total consumption of
19the high-skilled household); D(:) is an increasing and convex function of the amount of leisure
time devoted to on-the-job search (desutility function); ¯ is a psychological discount factor. The
resources of the high-skilled household include wage incomes, an unemployment beneﬁt f wu
t , the
rents from capital plus the proﬁts f Πt redistributed by the intermediate goods ﬁrms. Investment
expenditures are equal to net capital accumulation times the relative price of new capital goods
1=e et (see equation (3)). e Tt represents a lump-sum tax levied on the high-skilled household to
ﬁnance government expenditures (such as unemployment beneﬁts, policies consisting in giving
subsidies to, for example, low-skilled wages, etc.).
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From the envelope theorem, we can obtain the following additional dynamic relationships:
WH
Nc
t = Uf Ch
t
¡f wc
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¡g wsh
t ¡ f wu
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¡ D(eot) + ¯ pc


































represent, respectively, the value of the instantaneous
utilities obtained by the high-skilled household from having one additional member employed in
a complex or a simple job.
From equation (33) it can easily be obtained the value of the discount factor:
1 + rt+1 =
1
¯
(1 + g g Ch
t+1
) : (40)
Since at the balanced growth path gf Ch = g in the equilibrium we have 1 + r = 1
¯(1 + g). Using
also equation (33) we determine the endogenous growth rate of the model (Euler equation):
g =
¯
(1 + ge e)
£
z0 e0 (1 ¡ ¹) ¡
(1 ¡ ¯)
¯
(1 + ge e) ¡ ± ¡ ge e
¤
(41)
20where, in the equilibrium path, ge e = ¸ g e K and g e K =
g
1¡¸ (see appendix). The main diﬀerence in
this Euler equation with respect to a standard growth model is the appearance of obsolescence
costs (negative impact of ge e). These are due to the presence of embodied technological progress,
which increases the user cost of capital because of the expected loss in its value derived from
the fact that future technological improvements only aﬀect new capital goods. An acceleration
in the growth rate of embodied technological progress results, then, in a decrease in the overall
growth rate.
Notice that g depends only on parameters remaining constant at the equilibrium path (AK
technology). The growth rate is modiﬁed only when there are changes in the psychological
discount factor, in the depreciation rate, in the aggregate marginal productivity (z0e0) or a
reassignment process in the stock of capital (variation in any of the parameters ¹; ¸; °). Since
individual ﬁrms do not internalize the LBD externality, the individual marginal productivity of
capital is a fraction (1 ¡ ¹) of the aggregate marginal productivity (z0e0).
The ﬁrst order optimality conditions (34) and (35) are already written in intensive form. The
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The representative low-skilled household
Low-skilled unemployed workers must choose between searching for a simple job or doing some
“domestic production”. Their sole decision variable is the fraction of time elt they devote to
job search rather than to domestic activities since, by assumption, the low-skilled household



















21subject to (16-b) and the ﬂow budget constraint:
f Cl











t is a function of the initial value of the state variable Nsl
t , f Cl
t is the total amount consumed
by the low-skilled household, e yd
t is the productivity of unemployed workers on domestic activities
and it is proportional to aggregate marginal productivity.




















is the instantaneous utility of an additional simple job at time t + 1.
From the envelope theorem we obtain:
WL
Nsl
t = Uf Cl
t
¡ f wsl
t ¡ f wu



































































At the beginning of every period wages are renegotiated between intermediate ﬁrms and workers.
Since there are three types of match (high-skilled worker on a complex or a simple job and low-
skilled worker on a simple job) we will have three diﬀerent levels of wages. All of them are









































22where ´i, for i = c; sh; sl represent the workers bargaining powers, WH
Ni 8i = c;sh, WL
Nsl the
utility surplus obtained, respectively, by high- and low-skilled households from having one ad-
ditional member employed and g WF
Ni 8i = c;sh;sl the marginal increase in the surplus obtained
by the ﬁrm when ﬁlling a complex or a simple vacancy.



























1¡´i 8i = c; sh; sl. Since in the balanced growth path both, g WF
Ni
t
8i = c; sh; sl
and f C
j
t 8j = h; l, grow at rate g, their ratio is constant, i.e. WH
Ni
t




invariant in the equilibrium path.
4 Model Calibration and Simulations
In this section we calibrate the model and use deterministic simulation exercises to illustrate the
properties of the model and gain insight on the eﬀects of various types of shocks. The emphasis
will be on the eﬀects of labor force composition and embodied technological progress and their
interactions with “institutional” settings over the period 1976-1996.
4.1 Speciﬁcation and Calibration
The matching function on each labor market segment is represented by the usual Cobb-Douglas






















for complex and simple jobs respectively. As in many RBC models, we represent the instan-
taneous utility by the logarithm of per capita consumption expenditures. The leisure cost of
on-the-job search is proportional to the amount of time spent and home productivity is assumed
to be equal to a fraction Ã of aggregate productivity. More formally:




















1 ¡ eht (58)





elt Low-skilled unemployed search eﬃciency (59)
The parameters of the model are whenever possible set to values compatible with the available
empirical evidence. The parameters for which no empirical estimates are available are chosen
so as to reproduce the situation observed in Belgium in the mid nineties (1996). As in most
EU countries, the Belgian economy was then neither in a recession nor in a boom. In terms of
employment performance, the Belgian economy is in the EU average and quite representative of
a typical “European” economy.
The numerical values of the parameters are reported in table 3. The reference period is the
quarter. The elasticity of output with respect to capital coincides with the capital share of
total income; it is set to the standard value 1 ¡ ¹ = 0:33. The depreciation rate ± is set to
2.5%. We assume that high- and low-skilled workers are equally productive on simple jobs
(º = 1). Calibrating the parameters describing the eﬃciency of the LBD processes turns out to
be complicated due to the absence of empirical data concerning them. We take as reference the
extended version of paper by Boucekkine, del Rio, and Licandro (2002) where they implement a
quantitative exercise on the basis of the US economy. They estimate the ratio ¸=¹ to be around
0.75 before 1973 and around 0.90 after 1973. Even if in our case we are dealing with an European
economy, we use these values as reference11. We set ¸ equal to 0.6 (then ° equals 0.06) so that in
1996 the relationship between ¸ and ¹ is around 0.9. The value of the constant z0e0 is set so as
to reproduce the average growth rate of the Belgian economy between 1976-1996 (period after
the ﬁrst oil shock). The eﬀects of embodied technical progress on the relative demand for high-
and low-skilled workers are determined by the values of parameters a0 and a1. These values are
11The important aspect for our simulations is not the absolute value of ¸ itself, but rather the variation it suﬀers
between 1976 and 1996. Using the estimates provided in Boucekkine, del Rio, and Licandro (2002) as reference
simply allows to assume a realistic value for the eﬃciencies of the technological progress learning processes.
24chosen so as to reproduce the 1976 and 1996 values of the Cobb-Douglas coeﬃcients ¹µc and
¹µs reported in Sneessens and Shadman (2000) for the Belgian economy.
Symbol Value Symbol Value
Production z0e0 0.19 ¹ 0.66
¸ 0.60 ° 0.06
º 1.00 ± 0.025
a0 251 a1 0.87
Labor force composition ® 0.67
Preferences ¯ 0.99 ¿ 0.35













Matching eﬃciencies mc 0.48 ¸c 0.50
ms 0.48 ¸s 0.50
Bargaining power ´c 0.50




Job destruction rates Âc 0.03 Âs 0.045
Average replacement ratio bu 0.35
Table 3: Numerical parameter values (year of reference: 1996)
We deﬁne the high-skilled group by an educational attainment level at least equal to a upper-
secondary degree and set ® = 0:67, the 1996 value reported by Sneessens and Shadman (2000)
for Belgium. As in most RBC models, consumer’s psychological discount factor ¯ is set to
0.99. The domestic productivity parameter Ã is ﬁxed at 0.19 (i.e. the domestic productivity
of a low-skilled worker equals 19% of the average aggregate productivity), a value which seems
reasonable and gives a realistic relative wage (wsl=wc = 64%, a value close to the relative wages
estimated in the OECD (1996) for Belgium). We assume a Katz index12 of 0.58 (as in Joseph,
Pierrard, and Sneessens (2004)). This leads to a relative minimum wage of 0.4 which is below
the 0.5 wage perceived by low-skilled workers in simple jobs. This result remains compatible
with the Belgian evidence where only 2% of workers perceive the legal minimum wage.
12Deﬁned as the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage.
25We have four search intensity equations, two for each segment of the labor market. We impose
identical parameter values for a given segment, which leaves four values to ﬁx. The simple job
market search intensity coeﬃcients have been chosen so as to have a sensitivity to labor market
tightness of the order of magnitude estimated by Patacchini and Zenou (2003) (around 0.4). The
complex market search intensity coeﬃcients, the disutility parameter ¿, the constants vc
0 and
vs
0 and the two matching eﬃciency parameters are given values to reproduce the 1996 values of
the high- and low-skilled unemployment rates (6.8% and 20.1%, respectively), the probabilities
of ﬁlling a vacant complex or simple job (qc
t and qs
t, around 0.5; see Delmotte, Hootegem, and
Dejonckheere (2001)) and the probabilities of ﬁnding a complex or a simple job (values ps
t and
pc
t such that the probability to ﬁnd a job is around 20% for a low-skilled worker and 40% for a
high-skilled-worker; see Cockx and Dejemeppe (2004)).
We follow most authors and set the parameter determining the worker’s share of a match sur-
plus at the same value as the coeﬃcient of unemployment in the matching function13 (see for
instance Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996)). The latter is set equal to 0.5, a value obtained in
many empirical estimates of the Cobb-Douglas matching function (see Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001)). Calibrations for the average replacement ratio (bu = 35%) and the two job destructions
rates (Âc = 3% and Âs = 4:5%) are based on estimations by Van der Linden and Dor (2001) for
the Belgian economy. A result of this calibration exercise is that the proportion of high-skilled
workers on simple jobs equals 6.3%.
4.2 Steady State Simulations
We examine14 the steady state eﬀects of four diﬀerent types of shocks: one labor force composi-
tion change (in ®), one productivity shock (an increase in the eﬃciency of the learning process in
the investment good sector (¸)) and two types of wage shock (an increase in the unemployment
beneﬁts (wu) and a subsidy to low-skilled wages (txs)). As it can be observed, the exogenous
variables chosen to be shocked correspond, to policies (subsidies to low-skilled wages, increase in
unemployment beneﬁts,etc.) or stylized facts (development of embodied and disembodied tech-
13This choice is typically motivated by the so-called Hosios-Pissarides eﬃciency condition. It is worth noting
that in our setup with job competition this condition may not be suﬃcient to ensure eﬃciency.
14We use the software Dynare developed at CEPREMAP (Paris) by Michel Juillard.
26nological progress, increase in the proportion of high-skilled workers, etc.) observed over the
last decades in many European countries. The results for the long run eﬀects are summarized
in tables 4-7. We brieﬂy comment each exercise.
Labor force composition
A rise in ® (the proportion of high-skilled workers in total labor force) increases the probability to
ﬁll a complex job in the equilibrium path, and thus stimulates the opening of complex vacancies.
The higher amount of complex jobs deteriorates its marginal productivity, leading to a reduction
in wc. On the other side, the marginal productivity of simple jobs is stimulated (the relative
wage improves), and the number of simple vacancies raises. The search eﬀort of high- and low-
skilled workers on the simple segment of the market (1 ¡ eht and elt, respectively) increases.
This results in an upturn of the ladder eﬀect. All in all both unemployment rates decrease.
The equilibrium growth rates are not aﬀected by a change in ® since none of the parameters
being determinants of g is modiﬁed.
Low-skilled High-skilled Low-skilled Aggregate Relative Ladder Growth
search unemployment unemployment unemployment wage eﬀect rate
eﬃciency rate rate rate
Benchmark simulation
corresponding to the 39.2% 7.0% 20.5% 11.5% 63.7% 6.3% 1.11%
year 1996
Proportion of high-
skilled workers: +16.2 -0.4 -3.4 -1.7 +3.5 +3.2 +0.00
® = 0:670 ! ® = 0:700
Table 4: Steady state eﬀects (deviations from the benchmark) of an increase in the proportion
of high-skilled workers.
Biased technological shock
We now consider the eﬀects of an improvement in the learning eﬃciency of embodied technolog-
ical progress. More particularly, we introduce an increase in ¸ of 1.5%. From equation (41) we
observe that the acceleration in the growth rate of embodied technological progress (coming from
27the upturn in ¸) negatively aﬀects the equilibrium growth rate g15 (productivity slowdown). At
the same time, because of the new technologies-skill complementarity relationship (equation 5),
the increase in ¸ raises the share of complex jobs in the production function leading the ﬁrm
to open more complex vacancies. The higher µc
t avoids the appearance of decreasing returns on
complex jobs and wc increases. Search eﬀorts on the complex segment are stimulated.
Low-skilled High-skilled Low-skilled Aggregate Relative Ladder Growth
search unemployment unemployment unemployment wage eﬀect rate
eﬃciency rate rate rate
Benchmark simulation




technical progress -9.0 +0.2 +3.5 +1.0 -1.2 -0.7 -0.03
learning process:
¸ = 0:600 ! ¸ = 0:610
Table 5: Steady state eﬀects (deviations from the benchmark) of a biased technological progress.
On the simple side, the evolution is the opposite. The reduction in µs
t has a negative impact
on the productivity of simple jobs. Firms open less simple vacancies and the number of simple
jobs falls. Wages are reduced and the search eﬀort on the simple segment too. Low-skilled
unemployment increases and so does high-skilled unemployment since the demand for high-
skilled in complex jobs is unable to compensate the downturn in the ladder eﬀect.
Replacement ratio
An increase in the replacement ratio mainly aﬀects low-skilled workers, whose consumption is
constrained by their revenue. A higher replacement ratio, raises their reservation wage. This
pushes wages of low-skilled workers up and decreases the supply of simple vacancies. The
downturn in simple jobs raises their marginal productivity which increases their relative wages
even more. This stimulates search eﬀorts on the simple segment (rise in elt and the ladder
15The more important embodied technological progress, the higher will be the user cost of capital due to the
expected loss in its value coming from the fact that future technological improvements will only aﬀect new capital
stock.
28eﬀect).
Low-skilled High-skilled Low-skilled Aggregate Relative Ladder Growth
search unemployment unemployment unemployment wage eﬀect rate
eﬃciency rate rate rate
Benchmark simulation
corresponding to the 39.2% 7.0% 20.5% 11.5% 63.7% 6.3% 1.11%
year 1996
Unemployment beneﬁt:
wu = 0:246 ! wu = 0:271 -10.6 +0.2 +3.0 +1.1 +2.2 +0.3 +0.00
Table 6: Steady state eﬀects (deviations from the benchmark) of an increase in unemployment
beneﬁts.
The marginal productivity of complex jobs is negatively aﬀected by the reduction in the number
of simple jobs, which leads ﬁrms to open less complex vacancies. Both unemployment rates
increase. The equilibrium growth rate of the economy remains constant since none of its deter-
minants has been modiﬁed.
Subsidy to low-skilled wages
A target policy giving to ﬁrms a proportional subsidy to low-skilled wages (and ﬁnanced from
high-skilled wages) turns out to be very beneﬁcial for low-skilled workers (see Pierrard (2004) for
another quantitative example on the Belgian economy) in terms of unemployment reductions,
and somewhat damaging for high-skilled workers. Indeed, the subsidy increases the marginal
value the ﬁrm obtains from low-skilled workers, which stimulates the opening of simple vacancies
as well as the rise of low-skilled wages. Search eﬀorts of low-skilled workers on the simple segment
are thus increased. In contrast, the reduction in the relative wage earned by the high-skilled on
the simple segment (the marginal surplus the ﬁrm obtains from hiring a high-skilled worker in
a simple job is now relatively smaller) decreases their search eﬀort in this labor market segment
(ladder eﬀect falls).
Even if the increase in the number of simple jobs improves the marginal productivity of complex
jobs, the marginal value the ﬁrm obtains from a complex job is now smaller in relative terms.
There are, thus, less complex vacancies opened and complex employment is reduced. This, to-
29Low-skilled High-skilled Low-skilled Aggregate Relative Ladder Growth
search unemployment unemployment unemployment wage eﬀect rate
eﬃciency rate rate rate
Benchmark simulation
corresponding to the 39.2% 7.0% 20.5% 11.5% 63.7% 6.3% 1.11%
year 1996
Proportional subsidy
to low-skilled wages: +28.0 +0.2 -5.5 -1.7 +4.3 -0.6 +0.00
txs = 0:000 ! txs = 0:100
Table 7: Steady state eﬀects (deviations from the benchmark) of a proportional subsidy to
low-skilled wages.
gether with the downturn in the ladder eﬀect results in an increase of high-skilled unemployment
rates. Growth remains unaﬀected.
4.3 Historical Comparison
In the ﬁrst row of table 8 we reproduce, the 1996 values of the proportion of high-skilled workers
in the labor force (®), the share of complex jobs in the production function (¹µc), the net skill-
bias16, the high- and low-skilled unemployment rates, the relative wage (wsl=wc) and the ladder
eﬀect. The value of the average growth rate g corresponds to the period going from 1976 to 1996.
On the second row we display the change observed for all variables over the period 1976-1996.
The variation of g corresponds to the comparison of the average growth rates corresponding to
the periods 1950-1976 and 1976-1996, since what we analyze is the fall in average growth rates
before and after the oil shock (annual growth rates decreased by 2.4 percentage points).
The last two rows of table 8 contain the values predicted by our model for 1996 as well as the
predicted variation between 1976 and 1996 when we introduce the observed rise in the proportion
of high-skilled workers (it evolved from 21.5% of the total labor force in 1976 to 67% in 1996)
and the increase in the importance of embodied technological progress. The variation in ¸ is
ﬁnally chosen to reproduce the Belgian productivity slowdown (there is no empirical evidence
on this parameter for the Belgian economy). Moreover, the selected value of ¸ (¸=¹=0.61)




t) and the relative labor force
®=(1 ¡ ®):
30Prop. of Share complex Net High-skilled Low-skilled Relative Ladder Average
high-skilled jobs in the Skill unemployment unemployment wage eﬀect growth
in the production Bias rate rate rate
labor force function
Actual data
1996 0.67 0.51 1.59 6.8% 20.1% 66% n.a. 1976-96 1.1%
1976-96
absolute +0.45 +0.33 +0.20 +2.1 +13.3 -0.0 n.a. 1950-76 to 1976-96 -0.6
deviations
Model’s simulation
1996 0.67 0.52 1.75 7.0% 20.5% 63.7% 6.3% 1.1
1976-96
absolute +0.46 +0.32 +0.20 +1.7 +13.3 -0.6 +4.9 -0.6
deviations
Table 8: Skill-bias, unemployment rates, relative wages, ladder eﬀect and productivity slowdown
in Belgium: comparing actual and simulated data.
for 1976 manages to be quite coherent with the simulations implemented by Boucekkine, del
Rio, and Licandro (2002) for the U.S. economy. The model performs well in reproducing not
only the productivity slowdown (notice that the reference period is the quarter, therefore a
reduction in g of around 0.6 points per quarter implies that annual growth rates decreased
around 2.5 points which is coherent with the estimations given for Germany or France in table
2 or for Belgium here above), but also the increase in unemployment rates and the relative
wage stability. Incorporating endogenous growth to the model developed in Moreno-Galbis and
Sneessens (2004) keeps then its good properties in terms of a realistic representation of the
labor market and, at the same time, it permits to take into account growth issues (productivity
slowdown).
Given the results in the previous sections, it can be concluded that the increase in the eﬃciency of
the embodied technological progress is the main factor responsible of the rise in unemployment
rates. Actually, if the proportion of high-skilled in the labor force (®) had increased from
21.5% to 67%, everything else remaining constant, we would have observed a decrease in both
unemployment rates and a huge upturn in the ladder eﬀect. On the other hand, ceteris paribus,
a rise in the eﬃciency of embodied technical progress (¸), results in higher unemployment rates
because of the decreased demand for simple jobs which also leads to a reduction in the ladder
eﬀect (this aﬀects high-skilled workers). The combination of both shocks (upturn in ® and ¸)
31increases high- and low-skilled unemployment rates as well as the ladder eﬀect, this last one
raising by much less than in the case where only ® was modiﬁed.
In terms of the European stylized facts, the previous results can be interpreted as follows. The
post-1975 period has been characterized by a higher eﬃciency in the investment good sector
(upturn in ¸) and a consequent reduction in the learning eﬃciency of the ﬁnal good sector
(downturn in °). This technological reassignment favoring embodied technological progress
(upturn in ¸ and downturn in °) and inducing, thus, a rise in the obsolescence costs, has
increased the user cost of capital and lowered the growth rate permanently. On the other
hand, because of the new technologies-skill complementarity relationship, the acceleration of
embodied technical progress has stimulated complex jobs creation and simple jobs destruction.
The increased demand for high-skilled workers in complex jobs has been more than satisﬁed
by the large upturn in their supply. In contrast, the fall in the importance of the low-skilled
labor force has not been enough to compensate the massive destruction of simple jobs and the
increased job competition. Low-skilled unemployment rates have raised.
4.4 Alternative Policy Scenarios
During the beginning of the nineties crisis, many European governments started questioning
the suitability of the welfare state in the economic and social context corresponding to the end
of the twentieth century. Particularly, unions have been forced to negotiate with governments
measures tending to reduce the unemployment beneﬁts or restricting the access to them. We
analyze now two diﬀerent historic scenarios that could have arisen if, as a consequence of the
beginning of the nineties crisis, welfare policies regarding unemployment had been modiﬁed.
Tables 9 and 10 report the predicted results by the benchmark simulation for 1996 and the
predicted results after the policy measure is implemented during a period of time (ﬁnal state).
The tables display the simulated values for the proportion of high-skilled workers in the labor
force, the share of complex jobs in the production function, unemployment rates, relative wages,
the ladder eﬀect, the welfare levels and the average growth rates. We use as welfare indicators the
utility functions of each type of worker: Uh = ln(Ch
t =®)¡Nsh
t D(eot)=® proxies the high-skilled
welfare level and Ul = ln(Cl
t=(1 ¡ ®)) that of low-skilled.
32Prop. of Share complex High-skilled Low-skilled Relative Ladder High-sk. Low-sk. Average
high-skilled jobs in the unemploy. unemploy. wage eﬀect welfare welfare growth
in the production rate rate level level rate
labor force function
Model’s simulation for 1996: Benchmark simulation
1996 0.67 0.52 7.0% 20.5% 63.7% 6.3% -0.30 -0.70 1.1
Gradual decrease over 10 years in the replacement ratio until bu=25%
Final state 0.67 0.52 6.2% 12.5% 58.0% 6.4% -0.24 -0.82 1.1
Table 9: Comparison of the benchmark simulation for Belgium 1996 with a policy scenario where
the replacement ratio is reduced to 25%.
We start considering a situation where the replacement ratio is progressively reduced from 35%
to 25% over forty periods (ten years). More precisely, the calibrations we have adopted for the
initial ® correspond to the beginning of the nineties crisis (® = 0:60), and the variation in ¸ is
chosen so as to reproduce the slight decline (of around 0.55 percentage points) in the average
growth rates observed for Belgium between the early and the late nineties. The dotted lines
in ﬁgure 2 represent the evolution of diﬀerent economic variables over the nineties if, together
with the progressive increase in the proportion of high-skilled workers (®) and in the eﬃciency
of embodied technological progress (¸), the government had gradually reduced the replacement
ratio by ten percentage points, down to 25%. The solid lines in ﬁgure 2 correspond to the
benchmark simulation, i.e. the evolution that would have been observed if welfare policies had
remained unchanged (bu =35%) during the forty periods.
The downturn in the unemployment beneﬁt mainly aﬀects low-skilled workers whose consump-
tion is constrained by their revenue at each moment of time (they do not save). The fall in
their outside option leads low-skilled workers to reduce their reservation wage which permits
ﬁrms to oﬀer them lower wages. There are more simple vacancies opened and the demand for
low-skilled workers is then stimulated. This results in lower unemployment rates with respect
to the benchmark simulation during the transition period.
High-skilled unemployment rates remain, all through the transition period , at a lower level than
in the benchmark simulation. This is probably explained by the higher ladder eﬀect observed
















































0 10 20 30 40 50







































































































































































Reduction in the replacement ratio from 35% to 25%
Periods
Figure 2: Labor ﬂows, output growth rates, welfare level and relative wages: comparing the
benchmark transition with the transition observed if the replacement ratio is progressively re-
duced from 35% to 25%.
34under the implemented welfare policy, i.e. the opening of more simple jobs leads high-skilled
workers to look for a job in the simple segment even if the wage they earn is lower. The initial
upward trend observed for high-skilled unemployment rates in the two represented simulations
is due to the fact that the economy is not able to absorb immediately the rise in the number of
high-skilled workers coming from the upturn in ®. From around the 20th period (5 years after
the beginning of the policy), the increased demand for high-skilled labor derived from the gains
in the relative marginal productivity of complex jobs (new technologies-skill complementarity
relationship) manages to compensate their larger supply and high-skilled unemployment rates
start decreasing.
Prop. of Share complex High-skilled Low-skilled Relative Ladder High-sk. Low-sk. Average
high-skilled jobs in the unemploy. unemploy. wage eﬀect welfare welfare growth
in the production rate rate level level rate
labor force function
Model’s simulation for 1996: Benchmark simulation
1996 0.67 0.52 7.0% 20.5% 63.7% 6.3% -0.30 -0.70 1.1
Combining a gradual decrease over 10 years in the replacement ratio until bu=25% and a gradual increase
in the proportional subsidy to low-skilled wages up to 10%
Final state 0.67 0.52 6.1% 9.7% 63.1% 6.5% -0.26 -0.76 1.1
Table 10: Comparison of the benchmark simulation for Belgium 1996 with a policy scenario
where the replacement ratio is reduced to 25% and a proportional subsidy of 10% of low-skilled
wages is given to ﬁrms.
Because wages in simple jobs are deteriorated and those in complex jobs improved, relative
wages fall. This leads to an increase in high-skilled welfare levels (they can consume more)
and to a deterioration in low-skilled welfare levels. Even if at the end of the 10 years measure,
unemployment rates of both workers categories are lower than if the replacement ratio had been
maintained at 35% (see table 9), inequality is much higher in terms of wages and welfare.
Such a policy measure is thus not likely to be implemented by any European government wishing
to be re-elected unless this policy is associated with another measure trying to compensate low-
skilled workers for this loss in welfare. Here we assume that, in exchange for the progressive
35reduction of ten percentage points in the replacement ratio, a proportional subsidy of 10% of low-
skilled wages (given to the ﬁrms) is also gradually introduced at the same pace, this measure
being ﬁnanced on the basis of high-skilled wages, i.e. : at the beginning of the nineties the
government decides that, over the ten coming years, the replacement ratio will be progressively
reduced from 35% to 25% and a proportional subsidy to low-skilled wages will be increased, at
the same pace, from 0% to 10%.
In ﬁgure 3 the solid lines correspond again to the benchmark simulation, where only ® and ¸ are
rising to attend their end-of-the-nineties value, while the dotted lines represent the transition
under the implemented policies (together with the rise in ® and ¸, the replacement ratio is re-
duced and the subsidy to low-skilled wages increased). Comparing ﬁgures 2 and 3 we notice that
the introduction of the subsidy mainly favors low-skilled workers, whose demand is stimulated
and their relative wages improved.
While the transition of high-skilled unemployment rates remains almost unaﬀected with respect
to ﬁgure 2, low-skilled unemployment rates follow now a decreasing trend. Moreover, the intro-
duction of a subsidy almost dissipates the inequalities in wages and in relative consumption levels
(the relative consumption of low-skilled workers falls by 0.03 points with respect to the bench-
mark simulation) that were generated by the downturn in the replacement ratio. To completely
eliminate these inequalities it would be necessary to increase the subsidy by a bigger amount
than the decrease of the replacement ratio (here the subsidy is increased by ten percentage
points and the replacement ratio decreased by ten percentage points17).
Comparing tables 9 and 10 we conclude that an appropriate combination of two policies con-
sisting in reducing the replacement ratio while increasing the subsidies on low-skilled wages can
lead to a Pareto improving situation, where unemployment rates are lower and inequalities are
not increased.
17Convergency problems with the numerical simulations prevent us from implementing the case where the
increase in the subsidy to low-skilled wages is bigger than the decrease of the replacement ratio.
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Reduction in the replacement ratio combined with a subsidy to low−skilled wages
Figure 3: Labor ﬂows, output growth rates, welfare level and relative wages: comparing the
benchmark transition with the transition observed if the replacement ratio is progressively re-
duced from 35% to 25% and a proportional subsidy of 10% to low-skilled wages is also gradually
introduced.
375 Conclusions
Over the last decades, particularly after the ﬁrst oil shock, most European economies have been
characterized by the increase in unemployment rates, the stability in relative wages and the
decrease in per capita output growth rates (productivity slowdown). Even if these stylized facts
have arisen together most of the existing literature has treated them separately. That is, models
of economic growth have generally assumed full employment and labor market models have not
generally considered growth issues.
Since the beginning of the nineties there is, however, an emerging literature trying to explain
the interactions between unemployment and growth, most times in a comparative static analy-
sis. Our paper constitutes the ﬁrst attempt to deal simultaneously with the observed stylized
facts about unemployment, wages and growth in European economies. Our main contribution
consists, therefore, in taking into account both, European labor market and growth issues in a
dynamic setup. We build an intertemporal general equilibrium model with endogenous growth
and search frictions in the labor market. We calibrate it on the basis of Belgian data and verify
its ability to reproduce not only the labor market behaviors in this country between 1976 and
1996 (increase in high- and low-skilled unemployment rates by 2 and 13.3 percentage points,
respectively, and the relative wage rigidity) but also the evolution in growth rates (average
per capita output growth rate has decreased by 2.5 percentage points per annum). We ﬁnally
analyze from a dynamic perspective the implications of diﬀerent policy measures.
Evidently the model presents some limitations. Particularly, the speciﬁcation of new technologies-
skill complementary relationship seems somewhat ad hoc. On the other side, this paper does
not consider minimum wages while they have been a key determinant in European unemploy-
ment evolution. Incorporating them will certainly enrich the results (even if our model already
incorporates a source of wage rigidity through the domestic production).
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42Appendix: Equilibrium Growth Rates
This appendix explains the procedure followed to compute the equilibrium growth rates g and
g e K. The uniqueness of the growth path is guaranteed by the adopted calibration which implies
the positivity of K0, f Ch
t and g and, thus, a bounded utility. We start computing the equilibrium
growth rates associated to the ﬁnal good production sector and capital sector (law of motion of
capital). We then continue with the intermediate ﬁrms. The households optimality conditions
permit to determine the Euler equation. We ﬁnish with the wage bargaining conditions.
The ﬁnal ﬁrm
The production process as well as the marginal productivity of the diﬀerent types of jobs can
be easily written in terms of growth rates18:
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t equal zero, we have a balanced path characterized by: ge Y = g g FNc = g g FNsh =
g g FNsl = g and g e K =
g
1¡¸.
Equations (4) written in growth terms become:
ge et = ¸ gf Kt ¡ ¸ gN¤
t and ge zt = ° gf Kt ¡ ° gN¤
t (65)
so that in the equilibrium we ﬁnd: ge e = ¸
g
1¡¸ and ge z = °
g
1¡¸.
The law of motion of capital is redeﬁned as:
gf Kt = z0e0
e It
e Yt
¡ ± : (66)
Since at the equilibrium path gf Kt is constant,
e It
e Yt
must be constant, that is: ge I = ge Y = g.
18Notice that we are working in discrete time, therefore to put the expression in growth terms, we compute
logarithms and we subtract the ﬁrst diﬀerence.
43The intermediate ﬁrms
We determine now the growth rates of each variable involved in the intermediate ﬁrms’ equilib-




t = 0). We look ﬁrst to the
complex side of the labor market. By simply writing equation (19) in growth terms it is found
that, at the equilibrium, ge bc = g g WF
Nc
. Furthermore, replacing (19) and (30) in equation (20),
leads, after simple algebra, to the following equilibrium result: gf wc = g g FNc = g. Because vacancy
costs associated to complex jobs are indexed to f wc, we also have that ge bc = g e vc = g g WF
Nc
= g.
In the simple side we follow a similar procedure and replace conditions in (30) in equations (22)
and (23). After simple algebra we deduce that, at the balanced growth path, gg wsh = g g WF
Nsh
=
g g FNsh = gg wsl = g g WF
Nsl
= g g FNsl = g. Since vacancy costs associated to simple jobs are indexed to
the average simple wage we have that ge bs = g e vs = g.
The households
The budget constraint of the economy can be represented as follows:
e Yt ¡ e vt = f Ct + e It + e Tt (67)
where e vt represents the total vacancy costs (the costs of opening complex vacancies (e vc
t) plus the
costs of opening a simple vacancies (e vs
t)), f Ct the total consumption (that of high-skilled workers
plus that of low-skilled workers) and e Tt represents a lump-sum tax levied on the high-skilled
household to ﬁnance government expenditures.
Because taxes and vacancy costs are indexed to wages, at the equilibrium they grow at rate g.
Using the law of motion of capital, we have also shown that, at the balanced path, investment
and output must grow at rate g. Finally, given these results and the fact that we are using
a Cobb-Douglas production function and a logarithmic utility function we have that, at the
equilibrium growth path, gf Ct = g.
























44From the optimality condition UCh







we derive both, the value of the
discount factor at the equilibrium path and the Euler equation. Regarding the former, notice
ﬁrst that, in a growth context, the ﬁrm’s discount factor is not simply the interest rate, but the
“eﬀectiveness rate”, which is composed by two terms:
1 + rt+1 = e et g cK




The ﬁrst term on the right hand side represents the rents obtained by the ﬁrm in period t+1 if
it had invested one unit in period t (for each invested unit, the ﬁrm gets et units of capital and
each one produces g cK
t+1 rents in period t+1). The second term on the right hand side represents
the increase in the value of capital obtained by the ﬁrm when investing one unit in a growth
context. In words, for every unit of good invested in period t, the ﬁrm obtains (1 ¡ ±) e et units
of capital in period t + 1. Furthermore, these units are valued at price 1
g et+1.
The value of the discount factor at the balanced growth path equals 1+r = 1
¯(1+gCh
t ) = 1
¯(1+g).
On the other hand, from the household’s optimality condition, and knowing that ¯ = 1
1+½, where
½ can be interpreted as a rate of time preference, we also derive the Euler equation providing






































e et ¡ ½ + (g et+1 g FKt+1 ¡ ±)
1
1 + g g et+1
´
: (72)





(1 + g g et+1)
£
z0 e0 (1 ¡ ¹) ¡
1 ¡ ¯
¯
(1 + g g et+1) ¡ ± ¡ g g et+1
¤
; (73)
which at the equilibrium path becomes:
g =
¯
(1 + ge e)
£
z0 e0 (1 ¡ ¹) ¡
1 ¡ ¯
¯
































Therefore, at the equilibrium gWH
Nc = gWH
Nsh = gWL
Nsl = 0. The intuition behind this result
is that wages increase at the same rate as the marginal utility decreases leaving the actualized
value of the instantaneous utility of an additional job constant at the equilibrium path.
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